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Abstract
This paper studies duopoly in which two-sided platforms compete in differentiated
products in a two-sided market. Direct competition on both sides leads to results that
depart from much of the current literature. Under some conditions the unique equilib-
rium in pure strategies can be computed. It features discounts on one side and muted
differentiation as the cross-market externality intensifies competition. Less standard,
that equilibrium fails to exist when the externality is too powerful (that side becomes
too lucrative). A mixed-strategy equilibrium always exists and is characterized. These
results are robust to variations in the extensive form. The model may find applications
in the media, internet trading platforms, search engine competition or even health
insurance (HMO/PPO).
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1 Introduction
In many markets, firms must satisfy two constituencies: consumers on one side and adver-
tisers on the other in the case of media, policyholders and service providers for HMOs and
PPOs, search engine users and advertisers, or application developers and users of software
platforms. This paper analyzes platform competition when these firms engage in vertical dif-
ferentiation. The model herein departs from much of the current literature in that platforms
compete directly on both sides. Doing so qualitatively alters equilibria the understanding of
which is important in practice.
The game considered has three stages: quality setting on one side (B) then price setting
on the same side, and price setting on the other side (A). The dominant platform on side
B is the higher-quality one for A-side agents, so vertical differentiation arises endogenously
on side A. The insights of this paper are robust to alterations of the extensive form, and so
may be applied to several markets like newsprint, operating systems or video game consoles,
and even healthcare and education (see Bardey and Rochet, 2010 and Bardey et al, 2010).
The results also extend where prices are zero on one side, such as media broadcasting, many
internet trading platforms, and search engine competition.
A unique pure-strategy equilibrium exists only when the A-side revenue is not too lu-
crative. Then the optimal quality level of the top firm is lower than in a well-established
benchmark. In this equilibrium, B-side quality and A-side revenue become substitutes. We
know differentiation is a means of extracting consumer surplus whose cost is surrendering
market share to the competition. But here every B agent allows the platform to extract
surplus from side A as well, and so is more valuable. Thus B agents receive a discount
commensurate with the profits that can be extracted from side A; then a lesser quality is
necessary to attract the marginal B consumer.
Beyond a well-defined threshold, the quality-adjusted price of the high-quality firm is so
low that it preempts market B, and consequently side A as well. But then the excluded firm
possesses a non-local deviation and can monopolize the market too. Equilibrium distributions
of the mixed-strategy equilibrium are characterized. The market may be preempted ex post,
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which is a distinct feature of two-sided markets in practice; for example, there is a single
eBay, a single Google and a single newspaper in any U.S. city (except for New York City).
In this model it owes not to a contraction of market B but rather to an expansion of the A
market, which induces more aggressive competition for B-side consumers. Capturing these
phenomena requires there to be competition on both sides, a claim that I now further clarify.
Competition with differentiation has been studied, among others, in two papers by Gab-
szewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2001) (hereafter GLS) and Dukes and Gal-Or (2003) (now
DGO). In both, platforms act as monopolists in the advertising market (A), by each becom-
ing the sole conduit to their consumers (B). Irrespective of the exact construction, turning
platforms into local monopolies (bottlenecks) substantively affects the equilibrium precisely
because price competition on side A vanishes. In contrast, if the model is such that direct
(price) competition is preserved on the A market, a pure-strategy equilibrium may not exist
at all. If it does exist, even in an inherently symmetric environment such as Hotelling’s, a
pure-strategy equilibrium cannot be symmetric.
From a practical standpoint, restoring direct competition on both sides is important on
three accounts. First, the mere observation of a market gives no a priori indication whether
platforms should be modeled as bottlenecks. Second, casual observation of some two-sided
markets makes it plain that not all outcomes are symmetric (even if the model is). The
New York Times is sizeably larger than is closest competitor. According to this paper, this
asymmetry necessarily follows in many setups when direct competition exists on both sides.
Third, the bottleneck assumption understates the full extent of the competition between
firms. This is especially acute where prices are relevant on one side only. Search-engines,
for example, do not charge their users (B) for their services.
In this paper direct competition is re-introduced in the form of a ‘single-homing’ as-
sumption: both sides have unit demand. From Caillaud and Jullien (2003) we know that
single-homing amplifies competition directly on the side that single-homes, and therefore
indirectly on the other side.1 So too here, where direct competition for A-side consumers
1What is important for the characteristics of an equilibrium is whether there exists competition on both
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generates a premium to being the dominant platform on side B. When it is large enough,
this “premium effect” induces payoffs that are not quasiconcave; it is this lack of quasicon-
cavity that leads to a breakdown of the pure-strategy equilibrium. None of this arises absent
direct competition on the A side. Single-homing also finds empirical support in Kaiser and
Wright (2006) in the context of German magazines, in Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007) in
Italian newspapers and in Jin and Rysman (2010), who study sportscard conventions.
The works closest to this paper are GLS and DGO, which both study a media duopoly.
GLS allows advertisers to place at most one ad on each platform; this is what creates the
bottleneck. For a small externality the location equilibrium displays maximal differentiation;
if the externality is large enough firms co-locate. In DGO the payoff function is additive
over advertisers; this linear separability induces the bottleneck. The equilibrium exhibits
minimal differentiation.2 In the present model there cannot be a pure-strategy equilibrium
with co-location nor minimal differentiation. The reason is that such a configuration dis-
sipates A-side profits precisely because both firms compete in prices (i.e. directly) in that
market too. Armstrong and Wright (2007) study a model of bottlenecks that shares the
essential features of GLS and generates results similar in spirit. Ferrando et al (2008) take
the locations as fixed. Prices are set simultaneously on both sides and Nash equilibria in
prices can be computed. They resemble coordination equilibria in which the market may be
preempted by one platform. Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2004) consider endogenous costless
quality. Under single-homing, three mutually exclusive equilibria may arise: a symmetric,
Bertrand equilibrium; a preemption equilibrium and an interior (asymmetric) equilibrium.
This multiplicity owes to the extensive form: agents have to form expectations that are
fulfilled in equilibrium. In the present model instead, subgame perfection leads to a unique
equilibrium. In the context of health care, Bardey and Rochet (2010) allow insurance com-
panies to compete for patients (through premia) and service providers (through rebates).
Patients are heterogenous in their health risk and thus may value health services differently.
sides, not whether agents single-home or multi-home. Supplement available from the author.
2In GLS, the revenue function at the advertising pricing stage of the game is independent of the competi-
tor’s price. In DGO the bargaining stage is independent across platforms.
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This affects health plans’ payments to physicians and hospitals, but there is no direct com-
petition. The authors assert that little changes with direct competition on both sides. This
suggestion should be weighed with some caution in light of our results. Reisinger (2012)
allows for direct competition for homogenous advertisers, while differentiated consumers do
not pay for the platforms. Advertisers do not care for the relative size of a platform’s (the
better platform), but for the number of consumers, hence there is no premium effect.
The next Section introduces the model. Section 3 covers the characterization and some
implications. Section 4 presents an extensive discussion in which robustness checks are
performed. All proofs are sent to the Appendix, as well as some additional technical material.
2 Model
There are two platforms, identified with the subscripts 1 and 2, that market a good (for
example, news) to a continuum of B-side consumers of mass 1. Simultaneously it also sells
another commodity (such as advertising) on the A side.
B agents’ net utility function is expressed as u(b, θi, p
B
i ) = θib− pBi ; i = 1, 2 when facing
a price pBi . All B agents value quality in the sense of vertical differentiation – there is no






















θ1β − pB1 ≥ max
{
0, θ2β − pB2
})
. Hence they will purchase




A agents may choose to purchase at most one unit at price pAi if eDia− pAi ≥ 0; i = 1, 2,
where e is a scaling parameter and a represents the marginal benefit of advertising. A-
side agents are heterogenous in this parameter, which is uniformly distributed on [α, α]
with mass 1. The more B agents any A agent can reach, the more they value this ser-
vice, so demand Di represent the quality of platform i. The ranking of the platforms’
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and coverage D = (D1, D2), an A-side agent purchases from 1 over




. This decision rule generates the measure
Pr
(








. There is no externality from the A to
the B side (see the discussion, Section 4). The one unit limit implies competition on the
A-side. It can also be interpreted as a tight liquidity constraint.
There is no capacity constraint and zero marginal cost.3 The first assumption rules out
the trivial case in which the low-quality platform necessarily faces zero demand in the price
subgames on both sides; it is also sufficient for market coverage.
Assumption 1 β − 2β > 0, α− 2α > 0 and θβ ≥ 1
3
(θ − θ)(β − 2β).
Quality θi is costly and is modeled as an investment with cost kθ
2
i , where we impose
Assumption 2 k > (2β − β)2/18θ.
to obtain an interior solution in the benchmark problem.
Game: Platforms first choose a quality level simultaneously. Given observed qualities,
they each set prices to B consumers, who make purchasing decisions. With D observed,
they set prices to A agents in a third stage. This extensive form captures some real-life
situations.4 An alternative timing is discussed in Section 4; the results are robust to it. The
equilibrium concept is Nash subgame-perfect. The three-stage game is denoted Γ. For any










A,pB, θ)− kθ2i (2.1)
3A capacity constraint is either trivially exogenous, or endogenous as in Kreps and Scheinkman (1983),
which may induce a quantity-setting game instead of the price game.
4For example, in the case of media, B-prices (cover prices or subscription rates) are more difficult to
change than A-prices (advertising rates), and the media format even more so. Also, readership is often
reported to advertisers, so known to them when they purchase.
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3 Equilibrium analysis
We proceed in three steps, starting with the A side where the platforms’ behavior is not
directly affected by B-side quality choices.
3.1 A-market subgame
This stage replicates the result of the classical analysis of vertical differentiation. Let e∆D =
e · (D1−D2) denote the scaled difference in the platforms’ quality. Then equilibrium payoffs
take a simple form, for which the proof is standard and therefore omitted (see Tirole, 1988).
Lemma 1 Suppose D1 ≥ D2 w.l.o.g. There may be three pure strategy equilibria in the A
market. When D1 > D2 > 0, the profit functions write Π
A

















For D1 = D2, the Bertrand outcome prevails and platforms have zero profits.















− β for θi > θj. As











3.2 B-side price subgame
From Lemma 1 three distinct configurations may arise on the equilibrium path. In the first
case platform 1 dominates the B market, in the second one both share the B market equally








i , if Di > Dj;
0, if Di = Dj;















Figure 1: Best replies and unique equilibrium
This function is continuous with a kink at the profile of prices p̃B such that D1 = D2. More
importantly it is not quasi-concave because of the externality generated by A-side revenue;
therefore the best response is discontinuous.5 It is nonetheless possible to construct a unique
equilibrium in pure strategies, which always exists. (Note that observing θ1 > θ2 acts like
a coordination device; it rules out multiple equilibria.) The demonstration is left to the
Appendix, Section 6.3; here we discuss it briefly and focus on its outcome.
First, from (3.2), it is immediate that any price profile pB such that D1 = D2 is dom-
inated. Next we can define ‘quasi best responses’ corresponding to platforms playing as if
either D1 > D2 or D1 < D2 (for example, p2, p2 in Figure 1), from which we can construct
the true best replies – discontinuous at the points p̂1, p̂2. The discontinuity set is not trivial:
mixed strategies cannot restore the second candidate equilibrium – see Figure 1. Indeed an
outcome such that θ1 > θ2 and D1 < D2 entails playing a weakly dominated strategy for
player 2. So the intuitive reasoning whereby the low-quality firm may find it profitable to
5The conditions of Theorem 2 of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) are not met, and neither are those of Reny
(1999). The sufficient conditions (Proposition 1) of Baye et al (1993) also fail here, so their existence result
cannot be readily applied. A recent contribution by Philippe Bich (2008) establishes existence by introducing
a measure of the lack of quasi-concavity that resembles ironing. Our construction does remain essential in
that we face a potential multiplicity of equilibria and seek a characterization.
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behave very aggressively in order to access large advertising revenue does not hold true.6
Last, a necessary and sufficient condition for existence is verified by construction.
Proposition 1 Let θ1 > θ2 w.l.o.g. There may be two possible configurations arising in the
B-side price subgame. For each, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies:-































− eA; pB∗2 = 0
B-side prices resemble the S&S prices but include a discount (A − 2A < 2A − A < 0) that
is linear in the A-side profits. Platforms internalize the full value of the B agents, which
intensifies competition for their patronage. The quality spread ∆θ, fixed in the first stage,
may be too narrow to sustain two firms. That is, the high-quality platform may be able to
pre-empt the market with its quality choice, thank to the cross-market externality.
3.3 Equilibrium
In the first stage, platforms face the profit function (3.2), which they each maximise by
choice of their quality variable θi. That is, each of them solves
max
θi∈[θ,θ]















6That is, playing θi < θ2 but offering a very low price p
B






Figure 2: Profit functions for different values of the A-side profits
The constraint is a natural restriction guaranteeing that the endogenous threshold β̂ remain









− 2e(A + A) ≥ 0. Only the
second one is constraining.
These profit functions are not necessarily well-behaved. Section 6.1 of the Appendix
studies Π1(θ1, θ2) in the details necessary to support our results.
3.3.1 Pure-strategy equilibrium
For e(A + A) small enough the function Π1(., .) remains increasing (and concave) on the
portion beyond θ1 = θ̃(e) ≡ θ + 2e(A+A)β−2β , where it admits a maximiser. This is illustrated in
Figure 2 (the higher curve corresponds to the complementary case). To ensure this is the
case we impose












7θi → θj ⇒ β̂ → ∞.





defined in Section 6.1.
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which ensures that when θ̂1 solves the first-order condition, ∆θ ≥ 2e(A+A)β−2β so that both
platforms operate (Proposition 1). It is tantamount to saying the A market not too lucrative.
Proposition 2 Suppose Assumption 3 holds. The game Γ admits a unique equilibrium in
pure strategies in which both platforms operate and choose different qualities. It is character-




defined by Proposition 1, Lemma 1, and the optimal actions
θ∗2 = θ and θ
∗
1 = θ̂1, where θ̂1 uniquely solves











is labeled the ‘cross-market effect’; it acts as an incentive to reduce
quality. Condition (3.4) trades off the marginal benefit of quality (the left-hand side) with
its total marginal cost. The latter includes the marginal loss of A-side profit induced by
differentiation. More differentiation leads to higher B-side prices; but higher prices means
surrendering market share B-side market share, thus foregoing A-side profits. This increases
the cost of differentiation, which now becomes sensitive to the magnitude of A-side profits
as well. This plays an important role for the very existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium.
Comparative statics show that θ1 is decreasing in e: the more attractive the A-side profit, the
more powerful the cross-market effect and the more muted is the Differentiation Principle.
We can expand on the insights of Proposition 2, where we take S&S to be the benchmark.
Corollary 1 In any pure-strategy equilibrium of the game Γ, quality is lower than it would
be absent the A-market externality.
Differentiation is known to soften price competition, but here the cross-market externality
puts emphasis back on market share and forces the platforms to engage in more intense
price competition for B consumers. Lower consumer prices relax the need to provide costly
quality: the marginal B consumer demands a lesser product. This result resembles DGO’s
equilibrium, which they call ‘minimal differentiation’. Here it owes to the increased value of
each B-side consumer, which renders differentiation costlier.
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3.3.2 Mixed strategies
When Assumption 3 is not satisfied, the necessary first-order condition (3.4) fails to hold
entirely. As can be seen on Figure 2, the high-quality firm would like to pick the point θ̃(e),
where Π1(., .) reaches is maximum. At that point its rival is excluded (∆θ is too low). But
this cannot be an equilibrium for firm 2 can “leap” over firm 1 and become the monopolist
at a negligible incremental cost k(θ1 + ε)
2 − kθ21.
To appreciate the mechanics, the extent of the discount firm must offer, increases in
the A-side profits. The high-quality platform can further increase its price dominance by




∆θ(2β − β) + 2e(A− 2A)
]





∆θ(β − 2β) + 2e(2A− A)
]
. This goes on until the quality spread is so narrow
that firm 2 faces preemption; the market tips.
In the Appendix (Section 6.3) we show that a mixed-strategy equilibrium always exists.
Let Hi(θi) be the probability distribution over i’s play and hi(.) the corresponding density,
ΘNi the relevant support of Hi and θ
c
i the upper bound of the support. Let also H
∗
i be a best
response and Ri(θi, θj) denote the revenue accruing to i.
Proposition 3 The symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium of the game Γ is characterized by
the pair of distributions H1, H2 on Θ
N



















H∗i (θ) ∈ (0, 1), H(θc) = 1
and




and θc defined by θc = max
{
θ′i|Πi(θ, θ′i) = 0,Πi(θ̃(e), θ′i) = 0
}
, i = 1, 2.9
9The notation θi = θj in the second integral of (3.5) reflects that for θ̃(e) ≤ θi < θj , firm i collects zero.
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Condition (3.5) balances the expected benefit from adopting the distribution Hi with its
expected cost, when platform j plays the best response H∗j . The platforms do not mix over
all the pure actions that are available to them. To see why, recall that θ̃(e) is such that when
θ1 = θ̃(e) and θ2 = θ, platform 2 has no market share and 1’s profit are the highest. Suppose
firm 1 picks a higher action than firm 2 (θ1 > θ2); playing θ1 = θ̃(e) dominates any other
play below θ̃(e). In response, playing anything but θ2 = θ is dominated: θ secures 0 while
any other play generates a loss. Even if platform 1 selects a quality beyond the preemption
point (θ1 > θ̃(e)) firm 2’s profits are still maximized by playing θ because they decrease in




is dominated and no mass should be assigned on it; but θ
remains a best response to any quality θ1 ≥ θ̃(e), so there must be an atom at that point.





necessarily preempted by 2’s non-local deviation.
These equilibrium distributions do not rule out an outcome such that ∆θ is too small to
sustain two firms. However they guarantee that it does not happen with probability one.
To do so, platforms must (i) randomize and (ii) in doing so, try to sufficiently differentiate.
The next result further speaks to this point.
Proposition 4 Suppose e > ē. When no platform plays at the lower bound θ, the market is
necessarily monopolized ex post. Otherwise both operate.
Recall Proposition 1; depending on the choice of θ1, θ2, one or two platforms may operate
from the price subgame on. However the length of the interval [θ̃(e), θc] is not sufficient
to accommodate two firms: θc − θ̃(e) < 2e(A + A)/(β − 2β)–although clearly θc − θ ≥
2e(A + A)/(β − 2β).10 So for both platforms to survive, at least one of them must choose
the lowest quality.
Proposition 4 compares favorably to some industries’ idiosyncrasies. First, either monop-
olization or duopoly may be an ex post outcome, which fits some industry patterns.11 This
suggests an alternative rationale for the observed concentration in these markets. Accord-
10Corresponding to the condition ∆θ ≥ 2e(A+A)/(β − 2β).
11Markets such as print media, internet trading platforms or search engines are known to tip.
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ing to this model, some players may be driven out not because of a market contraction on
the B side, but because of an expansion on the other one. Second, ex post profits are not
monotonically ranked: the play (θ1, θ
c
2) implies Π1 > Π2 = 0 although θ1 < θ2. So too in
media for example, where the higher-quality shows (e.g. HBO) or magazines (e.g. The New
Yorker) do not necessarily yield higher profits.
3.4 Zero prices on one side
Many two-sided markets feature zero prices on at least one side. This may be an equilibrium
outcome or an exogenous imposition (or both in the sense of binding constraint). Examples
include broadcasting, the Yellow Pages or internet search engine usage.
Proposition 5 Fix pB1 = p
B
2 = 0. A pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist. A mixed-
strategy equilibrium exists and is characterised as in Proposition 3.
Proposition 4 tells us we should expect pre-emption in these markets. The examples of
Google (users do not pay) or eBay (buyers do not pay fees) lend credence to this claim.
These outcomes do not arise in a model without competition on both sides.
4 Discussion
This Discussion is offered largely without proof. These proofs do exist and are available from
the author.
One-sided or two-sided externality
The model ignores any externality the side A exerts on B agents. Media consumers may
dislike advertising; game developers seek more gamers to market to, and these likely enjoy
games’ diversity.
Introducing a second externality from A to B does not modify the results qualitatively.
This means the results are quite widely applicable. A negative A-to-B externality effectively
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damages the B-side quality of the dominant platform more than that of the dominated one.
In response that dominant platform must offer a further discount. This narrows the range
of parameters on which the pure-strategy equilibrium can be sustained. This feedback thus
hardens competition on side B. This is in line with DGO’s results, for example, who show
that the negative externality associated with adverts leads to minimal differentiation.
To see why, rewrite the B-side utility function as ui = θib − pBi − δqi, where δqi is
a disutility from A-side consumption level. A-side demand is defined as before; suppose






−β. The new term is δ∆q̃: the
utility impact of the difference in A-side expected consumption levels; these can be computed
given (θ,p). It can be shown that ∆q̃ = (α+α)/3: a constant. Let (α+α)/3 ≡ Â, eventually
the condition for platform 2 to be active turns into D2 ≥ 0 ⇔ ∆θ(β− 2β) ≥ 2e(A+A)+ Â,
which is more restrictive than the one of Proposition 1.
Bottlenecks and preemption
Suppose that A-side agents are able to place at most one ad on each platform, as in GLS.
Then they are a monopoly on side A with profits πAi = α


















The standard price functions pi(θ) are only shifted by eα
2/4 each – independently of what












exactly as in S&S. So the externality is present and affects prices, but not the quality
choices. When platforms are bottlenecks, the pass-through is perfect: consumers (B) receive
a discount that exactly exhausts what platforms can extract from the other side (A). Then
the incentives at the quality setting stage are standard. There is no incentive to decrease
quality nor for endogenous pre-emption through quality. The exact same outcome obtains
if introducing a A-to-B externality together with the bottleneck assumption.
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Robustness check: simultaneous moves
The three-stage game suits some industries well (e.g. media), but not necessarily all. For
example, Hagiu (2006) studies the problem of game console manufacturers, who must si-
multaneously commit to a price on each side of the platform. The analysis is robust to this
change in timing, except for one small variation.12. Consider the platforms’ problem at the












































[2α− α]; pA2 = ∆D̃3 [α− 2α] as before. The first-order conditions w.r.t. p
B
i simplify to
∆θβ − (2pB1 − pB2 )−
2
9
e [(2α− α)(α + α)] = ∆θβ − (2pB1 − pB2 )− 2A1 = 0
−∆θβ + (pB1 − 2pB2 )−
2
9
e [(α− 2α)(α + α)] = −∆θβ + (pB1 − 2pB2 )− 2A2 = 0
These are linear equations in B prices, as in the sequential move model. This readily suggests
that little will change from this new timing. This linearity arises because A profits are still
linear in ∆D̃. The solution concept is Nash equilibrium, the best replies are discontinuous
and there is a unique equilibrium in prices, with a condition on ∆θ. That condition is also
less restrictive than in the sequential-move game.
Things do change a little in the first stage. When the pure-strategy equilibrium can
be sustained, both first-order conditions may bind, thus yielding interior solutions for both
platforms. This is in contrast to the sequential game. But this behavior is non-monotonic:
for naught A-side profits platform 2 benefits from maximal differentiation, for low A profits it
seeks less differentiation (smaller ∆θ), and for large enough A profits, maximal differentiation
again. The reason is that under simultaneous moves, the discount offered by the dominant
firm in the B market is smaller. So ∆D – the difference in their market share – is also
12Here we discuss the results; the derivations can be found in a supplement available from the author
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smaller. As a consequence it is also less dominant in the A market and the condition on ∆θ
is less tight. This creates an incentive for the low-quality firm to capture some market share
in B by increasing quality. In the sequential game, the discounts are such that platform 2
never has such an incentive.
This difference in discounts owes to the timing. By way of (imperfect) analogy, one
can consider the difference between a Cournot and a Stackelberg game. In the latter, the
dominant firm commits to a strategy and the follower takes it as given. By the time they
move in the Amarket, platforms are committed to a strategy in the B market. This generates
incentives for platforms to behave more aggressively in the B market in the fist place.
5 Conclusion
This paper has developed an analysis of differentiation in a duopoly of two-sided platforms,
where competition prevails on both sides of the market. This yields markedly different results,
as compared to those typically found in the literature. Direct competition on the A side puts
a premium on being the better platform (here meaning covering a larger share) on the B side.
This exacerbates competition in market B, with consequences on the nature of equilibrium.
Whether a pure-strategy equilibrium exists depends on the relative attractiveness of A-side
profits; that is, we can identify why it may break down. This paper thus complements prior
works, in particular GLS and DGO who analyzed cases of bottleneck competition.
When a pure-strategy equilibrium exists, differentiation is hampered because too costly
in terms of market share. The more attractive the A side, the narrower is differentiation. It
may be insufficient to sustain two active platforms, at which point the equilibrium breaks
down. Then platforms play in mixed strategies and one of them may be preempted ex post.
These results are robust to a change in timing; all carry over to quantity competition in the
B market and the mixed strategy equilibrium remains valid under horizontal differentiation.
Hence they are not exclusive to the chosen extensive form and may find applications in a
broad array of industries.
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Our ability to compute an equilibrium rests on the simple structure chosen, and in partic-
ular on two important assumptions: single-homing and independence between A and B-side
consumption decisions. Single-homing is not essential but it is convenient. What is essen-
tial is that platforms compete directly for consumers on both sides, which single-homing
captures. Independence in consumption decisions is important; it implies that the A side
only cares for the B-side market share, not its composition. For example, it asserts that the
choice of media consumption is not a signal for good consumption. But we do know that
media companies strive to segment their markets to suit advertisers. These characteristics
are so far left out for future research.
6 Appendix
The Appendix contains some additional material as well the proofs of the propositions.







. With the reformulation of constraint (3.3), the objective function






∆θ(2β − β)2 +B1 + C∆θ
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A is a constant. From the first line of (6.1)
we can see why (3.3) is necessary: depending on C, the platform may seek a large or small
∆θ. The second line of (6.1) rules out the artificial case of firm 1 facing a demand larger






∆θ(β − 2β)2 +B2 + C∆θ
)
− kθ22, if ∆θ(β − 2β) > 2e(A+ A);
0, ∆θ(β − 2β) ≤ 2e(A+ A) and θ2 = 0;
−kθ22, ∆θ(β − 2β) ≤ 2e(A+ A) and θ2 > 0;
(6.2)















A. In the sequel θ1 > θ2 without loss of
generality. For this Section, take Proposition 1 as established. The profit function Π1(., .) is
obviously continuous for θ1 < θ +
√
C
β−2β or the converse. Furthermore, assume e < ∞, then




Proof: For ease of notation, let Π1 = Π
L
1 for all ∆θ ≥
√
C
β−2β and Π1 = Π
R
1 otherwise. These




for any pair (θ1, θ2). To the left platform 1 is a monopolist whose profits Π
L
1 are necessarily
bounded. The function is defined as ΠL1 : Θ1×Θ2 ⊆ R2 7→ R, therefore Theorem 4.5 in Haaser
and Sullivan ([17], page 66) applies: a mapping from a metric space into another metric space
is continuous if and only if the domain is closed when the range is closed. So ΠL1 (θ1, θ2) is
continuous at ∆θ =
√
C
β−2β , and is necessary the left-hand limit of the same function Π
L
1 . Now






β−2β from above for some fixed
θ2. This sequence exists and always converges for Θ1 ⊆ R is complete. As e < ∞ and A and
A are necessarily bounded, C is finite so there is some n and some arbitrarily small δ such
that ΠR1 (θ
n
1 , θ2)−ΠL1 (θ2 +
√
C
















When C becomes large enough, Π1(., .) is no longer well behaved.









such that Π1(., .) admits a binding
first-order condition for C ≤ Cf only. When C > Cf , its maximum is reached at the kink:






















− 2kθ1 = 0, for ∆θ >
√
C







− 2kθ1 < 0, for ∆θ >
√
C
β−2β and C > C
f ;
(6.3)





slope ϕ′(θ1) = 18k − 2C(∆θ)3 . Since ∆θ > 0, this FOC has at most two solutions: one where
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ϕ′(θ1) < 0 and the other with ϕ
′(θ1) > 0. The SOC requires ϕ
′(θ1) ≥ 0 for the FOC to
identify a maximiser, so there exists a unique local maximiser of Π1, denoted θ̂1. Let θ
0
1 be
the (unique) maximiser of the first line of system (6.3). It is immediate that θ̂1 < θ
0
1 and
consequently θ01 − θ2 ≤
√
C
β−2β , θ1 ∈ BR1(θ2) can never be true. That is, the two statements
of the first line of (6.3) cannot be simultaneously satisfied: firm 1 would not play the first












Because Π1 is monotonically increasing below θ̂1 and the SOC is monotonic beyond θ̂1, it
is concave for C ≤ Cf and θ̂1 is a global maximiser. The binding first-order condition
defines a function C(θ1, θ2) ≡ (∆θ)2
[




































and is not differentiable at ∆θ =
√
C
β−2β . By Claim 1 it is continuous, and monotonic on either
side of ∆θ =
√
C
β−2β . Therefore, θ̂1 such that ∆θ =
√
C
β−2β is the unique maximiser of Π1(θ1, θ2)
given some fixed θ2.
6.2 Existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium
Take Proposition 1 as established.
Proposition 6 A mixed-strategy equilibrium of the game Γ always exists.
This assertion holds trivially when Assumption 3 holds. The balance focuses on the case
where it fails. It is not immediate that the game admits a mixed strategy equilibrium, for
the payoff correspondences are not upper-hemicontinuous and their sum is not necessarily
so either. See Dasgupta and Maskin (1986). We need some preliminaries to establish the
Proposition.
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Denote θ̃ = θ +
√
C
β−2β from now on. It is not immediate that the game Γ admits a
mixed-strategy equilibrium, for the payoffs are not everywhere continuous. First define by
θc1 the threshold such that Π1(θ
c




|θ1>θ̃1 < 0 and the cost function is convex. Neither platform will want to
exceed that threshold, so we restrict the set of pure actions over which firms randomise to
be [θ, θci ] ⊆ Θi, i = 1, 2. Next, any distribution over this set must assign zero mass to
any θi ∈ (θ, θ̃) by Claim 3: any action in this interval is dominated by either θ or θ̃. For
[θ̃, θci ] large enough (and θ2 ≥ θ̃) there may be outcomes such that ∆θ >
√
C
β−2β , in which
case both platforms are active, or ∆θ ≤
√
C
β−2β , in which case only the high-quality firm
operates. Take θ1 > θ2 > θ and suppose ∆θ >
√
C
β−2β and Π1 > Π2 > 0. Let θ2 increase,
both Π1 and Π2 vary smoothly. But while limθn2 ↑θ1 Π1 = Π1 > 0, limθn2 ↓θ1 Π1 = −kθ
2
1, and
similarly for firm 2. Both payoff functions are discontinuous at the point θ1 = θ2. In this
case neither the payoffs nor their sum are even upper-hemicontinous. Following Dasgupta
and Maskin’s (1986) Theorem 5, it is first necessary to characterise the discontinuity set. If
it has Lebesgue measure zero, a mixed-strategy equilibrium does exist. Consider the case
where θ1 ≥ θ2 w.l.o.g. and define Υ0 =
{
(θ1, θ2)|θ1 = θ2, θi ∈ [θ̃i, θci ] ∀i
}
, the set on which
the payoffs are discontinuous. Further define the probability measure µ(θ1, θ2) over the set
ΘN = {θ1} ∪ [θ̃1, θc1]×{θ2} ∪ [θ̃2, θc2]. It is immediate that Υ0 has Lebesgue measure zero, so
that Pr ((θ1, θ2) ∈ Υ0) = 0. Next we claim
Lemma 2 Suppose θ1 = θ2 = θ, an equilibrium in mixed strategies exists in the B-side price
subgame.
As each platform’s payoffs are bounded below at zero and only one of them can operate
(except at pB1 = p
B
2 ), their sum is almost everywhere continuous, except for the set of pairs
(pB1 = p
B
2 ), which has measure zero.
Proof: Let θ1 = θ2 = θ. The sum of profits Π = Π1+Π2 is almost everywhere continuous.
Either Π = Π1 > 0 ∀pB1 < pB2 , or Π = Π2 > 0 ∀pB1 > pB2 , both of which are continuous except
at pB1 = p
B




2 )|pB1 = pB2 , (pB1 , pB2 ) ∈ R2
}
has Lebesgue measure zero. Theorem 5 of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) directly applies and
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guarantees existence of an equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Therefore the pair θ1 = θ2 = θ may be part of an equilibrium of the overall game. Then
Proposition 6 asserts that a mixed-strategy equilibrium of the game Γ exists, which can now
be easily proven.
Proof: We only need showing that the payoff functions Πi i = 1, 2 are lower-
hemicontinuous in their own argument θi. Without loss of generality, fix θ1 > θ2. We
know that Π1 is continuous for any θ1 > θ2 (refer Section 6.1). From Claim 3 it is immediate
that Π2 is continuous for θ1 > θ2. Last, for i = 1, 2
Πi =
 0, if θ1 = θ2 = θ;−kθ2i , if θ1 = θ2 > θ.
that is, Πi, i = 1, 2 is l.h.c. Since (θ2, θ1) s.t θ2 = θ1 ∈ Υ0, Theorem 5 in Dasgupta and
Maskin (1986) can be applied, whence an equilibrium in mixed strategies must exist.
6.3 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: The proof begins by showing existence of an equilibrium, then











Definition 1 For i = 1, 2, the platforms’ ‘quasi-best responses’ are defined as the solution
to the problem maxpBi Πi
(
pBi , Di(p
B, θ); ΠAi (Di, Dj)
)
, where the profit function is defined















pB2 +∆θβ − 2eA
)














pB2 +∆θβ + 2eA
)
















pB1 −∆θβ − 2eA
)














pB1 −∆θβ + 2eA
)
, if D1 > D2;
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While it is always possible to find some point where ‘quasi-best responses’ intersect (e.g.
such that both play as if D1 < D2), it by no means defines an equilibrium. Doing so assumes
that in some sense platforms coordinate on a particular market configuration – for example,
such that D1 < D2. We first need to pin down the firms’ true best replies.
Lemma 3 Let θ1 > θ2 w.l.o.g. There exists a pair of actions (p̂1, p̂2) such that the best

































, for p1 ≥ p̂1;
(6.5)
Lemma 3 thus defines the ‘true’ best-response of each player. It says that platform 1, for









otherwise. The best reply correspondence is discontinuous at that point where platforms are























Proof: Any profile p̃B such that D1 = D2 can never be an equilibrium. When D1 = D2
A profits ΠAi are nil for both platforms. Both players have a deviation strategy p
B
i + ε




i > 0, i = 1, 2 as soon as Di ̸= D−i. Maximizing the
profit function (3.2) leaves us with two ‘quasi-reaction correspondences’, for each competitor,
depending on whether D1 > D2 or the converse. Depending on firm 2’s decision, platform

















pB2 +∆θβ − 2eA
)




















pB2 +∆θβ + 2eA
)



























. This is the difference in profits
generated by firm 1 when it chooses one ‘quasi-best response’ over the other. For pB2 suffi-
ciently low, g1 > 0. This function is continuous and a.e differentiable. Using the definitions
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< 0, and d
2g1
d(pB2 )
2 = 0, whence
there exists a point p̂B2 such that g1(p̂
B



















platform 1 is indifferent between either best response pB
1




2 ). The same follows





















⇔ pB2 ≥ p̂B2 ≡ −
(






















⇔ pB1 ≥ p̂B1 ≡ ∆θβ − e(A− A)
For each firm, its action must be an element of the best reply correspondence and these
correspondences must intersect. We define a condition that captures both these features.

























, if D1 < D2;
An equilibrium exists only if these intersections are non-empty. Together, the definitions of
a best-response profile (relations (6.4) and (6.5)) and of an equilibrium candidate sum to
Condition 1 Either
p̂B1 ≥ p∗B1 and p̂B2 ≤ p∗B2
or
p̂B1 ≤ p∗B1 and p̂B2 ≥ p∗B2
or both.
Consider an action profile p∗B satisfying this condition; from Lemma 3 each p∗Bi is an element
of i’s best response. For it to be an equilibrium the reaction functions must intersect. This
is exactly what Condition 1 requires. For example, the first pair of inequalities tells us that
player 1’s optimal action has to be low enough and simultaneously that of 2 must be high
enough. When they hold, player 2’s reaction correspondence is continuous until 1 reaches
the maximizer p∗B1 , and similarly for firm 1.
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to exist. When both inequalities are satisfied, the game admits two equilibria.
When Condition 1 holds, the Nash correspondence pB1 (p
B
2 )× pB2 (pB1 ) has a closed graph and
standard theorems apply.
Proof: Each platform’s action set pBi ⊆ R is compact and convex, and so can be parti-














, on which the best-response







. By construction it is defined as the intersection of
the ‘quasi-best responses’, which is not necessarily an equilibrium. But when Condition 1
holds, following the definitions given by equations (6.4) and (6.5), either p∗B1 ∈ pB1 (p
B
2 )
and p∗B2 ∈ pB2 (pB1 ), or p∗B1 ∈ pB1 (pB2 ) and p∗B2 ∈ pB2 (p
B
1 ) (or both, if two equilibria exist).






the reaction correspondences necessarily intersect at least once,
whence the Nash correspondence has a closed graph and the Kakutani fixed-point theorem












































, or both if two equilibria exist. For the first equality to hold,
the first line of Condition 1 must hold, and for the second one, the second line of Condition 1
must be satisfied.
Condition 1 provides us with a pair of easy-to-verify conditions in terms of prices.
Lemma 5 Existence. An equilibrium in pure strategies of the B-side price subgame always
exists.











B, θ)− kθ22 +ΠA2 , respectively. Solving for


















































− eA; p∗B2 = 0





indeed constitutes an equilibrium by Lemma 4. This equilibrium always exists
because p̂B1 ≥ p∗B1 and p̂B2 ≤ p∗B2 are always satisfied. Indeed, either both hold when both








≥ 0 is always true, or p∗B2 = 0 > p̂B2 and p̂B1 >









and platform 2 as if ΠL2 = p
B
2 D2(p











































, therefore D1 > 0 if ∆θ >
√
C
2β−β . An equilibrium such that p
∗B





− eA cannot exist, for these prices are
not best response to each other. At the price-setting stage, the cost of quality is sunk, so for
θ1 > θ2 there always exists some price p
B
1 ≥ pB2 such that consumers prefer purchasing from









≤ 0. Given that ∆θ ≥
√
C
2β−β , take the lower bound and substitute into the second







> 0, ∀β ≥ 0
which violates the second pair of inequalities of the necessary Condition 1. So the second
candidate can never be an equilibrium. For completeness, Condition 1 is also sufficient












. The SOC of the profit
function (3.2) is satisfied at prices p∗Bi and p
∗∗B
i ∀i, ∀pB−i, there cannot be any local deviation.
Consider now deviations involving inconsistent actions, that is, such that both platforms
maximise either pBi Di(p
































= ∅ as well.
Finally, directly from Lemma 5, we can conclude the proof. In particular no alternative
equilibrium can exist when ∆θ <
√
C





− eA; pB2 = 0 do form an equilibrium for they satisfies Condition 1. But again the pair





− eA cannot be best responses to each other.
Proof of Proposition 2: We begin by characterising the first-stage actions
Lemma 6 Let θ1 > θ2 w.l.o.g. and Assumption 3 hold. Optimal actions consist of θ
∗
2 = θ
and θ∗1 = θ̂1, where θ̂1 uniquely solves





Proof: The following simplifies the analysis and lets us focus on platform 1’s problem.
Claim 3 In any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (θ∗1, θ
∗






2 = θ necessarily.





 −(β − 2β)2 + C(∆θ)2 − 2kθ2 < −2kθ2, if ∆θ(β − 2β) >
√
C;
−2kθ2, if ∆θ(β − 2β) ≤
√
C.
whence it is immediate that dΠ2
dθ2
|θ2>θ < dΠ2dθ2 |θ < 0.





− 18kθ1 = 0 and admits a unique
maximiser θ̂1. Suppose firm 1 plays θ̂1; by Claim 3, platform 2 cannot increase its quality








is an equilibrium as long as firm 2 cannot ‘jump’
over firm 1 and become the high-quality firm. It will necessarily do so if platform 1 turns
out to be a monopolist. To guarantee firm 2 operates we need (θ̂1 − θ)(β − 2β) >
√
C
(Assumption 3). The smallest ‘leap’ firm 2 can undertake is such that θ̃2 ≥ θ̂1 + ε. Hence
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θ̂1, θ̂1 + ε
)
, or
(θ̂1 − θ)(β − 2β)2 +B2 + C(θ̂1−θ) ≥ B1 +
√
C(β − 2β)− 9k(θ̂1 + ε)2
(θ̂1 − θ)
[
(β − 2β)2 + (2β − β)2
]
− 9kθ̂21 +B2 ≥ B1 +
√
C(β − 2β)
using the FOC (2β − β)2 − 18kθ̂1 − C(θ̂1−θ)2 = 0 and the fact that kθ̂1θ = kθ
2 = 0 (by
assumption). When θ̂1 − θ >
√
C
β−2β , this condition is always satisfied.
The optimality of θ∗2 = θ and θ
∗
1 = θ̂1 is established by Lemma 6. The rest of the claim
follows immediately under Assumption 3.
































, respectively. This problem is concave and given equilib-
rium prices p∗i , has obvious maximizers θ
0






















2) ∀k > 0, it is also true that




≥ Π2 (θ01, θ02).
Proof: Consider a deviation θ̃2 = θ
0
1 + ϵ, ϵ arbitrarily small. We can compute firm 2













− 2k(θ01 + ϵ) < 0.






− 2kθ01 = 0 and compare it to equation (6.6).
Proof of Proposition 3: Sharkey and Sibley (1993) provide an appealing approach to
characterize mixed strategies in a problem of entry with sunk cost, but it does not quite apply
here. There is no proper entry stage; in particular, playing θi = θ cannot be interpreted
as a decision to not enter the market because Πi(θi, θj) > 0 for θj such that ∆θ >
2e(A+A)
β−2β .
Also, the payoffs depend not just on the ranking of the firms’ decisions (θ1, θ2), but on the
difference θ1 − θ2.
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Let θci denote the upper bound of the support of the distribution of the pure action space,
a precise definition of which will soon be provided. Let Hi(θi) be the distribution over i’s




. For any equilibrium mixing probability H∗2 (θ2), write the
expected profit of firm 1 as
Eθ2 [Π1] =
∫
Π1(θ1, θ2)d(H1 ×H∗2 ) +
∫ θ′1=θ2
θ̃1
















Π1(θ1, θ2)d(H1 ×H∗2 )
with possibly an atom at θ1. With probability
∫ θ′1=θ2
θ̃1
d(H1 ×H∗2 ) it plays θ1 > θ such that
2 is the dominant firm (θ2 ≥ θ1); in this case, Π1(θ1, θ2) = −kθ21 < 0. With probability∫ θc1
θ′1=θ2
d(H1 ×H∗2 ) it is the dominant firm (the second integral). We first claim
Lemma 7 There is a mass point at θi. More precisely, ∀ i, Hi(θi) ∈ (0, 1).
Proof: Suppose H1(θ1) = 1, then argmaxEθ1 [Π2(θ1, θ2)] = θ̃2, so H2(θ2) = 0 and H2(θ2)
assigns full mass at θ̃2 : h2(θ̃2) = 1. But then firm 1 should play some θ1 > θ̃2 and become












, Π1(θ1, θ2) > 0 and platform 1 should shift some mass to θ1.
The equilibrium conditions write ∀θi ∈ ΘNi ,
Eθj [Πi(θi, θj)] = Πi(θi, θ̃j)
Πi(θi, θ̃j) = 0
(6.7)
The first line asserts that i’s expected payoff cannot be worse than if not investing for
sure, in which case j’s best response is θ̃j. The second one sates that if not investing for
sure, a platform can only expect zero profits. Thus expected profits in the mixed-strategy
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equilibrium must be zero. We next need to determine the upper bound θci of the support of
Hi(θi) for each platform i = 1, 2. As a consequence of Lemma 7 it solves either
Πi(θj, θ
c
i ) = 0 or Πi(θ̃j, θ
c
i ) = 0
hence
Lemma 8 θci = max
{
θ′i|Πi(θj, θ′i) = 0,Πi(θ̃j, θ′i) = 0
}
Proof: Let θ′i solve Πi(θj, θ
′
i) = 0 and θ
′′
i solve Πi(θ̃j, θ
′′









there is a measure θ′′i − θ′i on which i places zero weight. Then j should shift at least some
weight to θ′i + ϵ, ϵ > 0 and small, to obtain EĤ(θi) [Πj] > 0 = Eθi [Πj(θi, θj)] (where Ĥ(.) is
an alternative distribution). Clearly this extends to any θi ∈ [θ′i, θ′′i ).













where Ri(θi, θj) stands for platform i’s revenue (gross of costs). For any play θj, total
revenue Ri(θi, θj) is decreasing in θi ∈ ΘNi \ θi – refer Conditions (6.1) and (6.2). Thus for
any distribution Hi(θi)×H∗j (θj) the LHS is bounded as well, and decreasing in θi.
Proof of Proposition 4: When e is large enough platform 1 (the high-quality firm)
prefers playing such that ∆θ = 2e(A+A)
β−2β ≡ z(e) for any θ2 (and θ1 not so large as to induce
negative profits). Its payoffs when ∆θ ≤ z(e) are given by the second line of (6.1), where









+ 2e[A(5β − 4β)− A(β + β)]
]
− kθ21














if ∆θ > z(e). Let π1(e, θ) = max π1(e, θ) for any pair θ1 > θ2 such that ∆θ = z(e). This is
an upper bound on firm 1’s profits for any play by firm 2. We know π1(e, θ) is maximized
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> 0 when ∆θ < z(e) and ∂π1(e,θ)
∂θ1
< 0 when ∆θ = z(e) and θ2 > θ. Therefore
π1(e, θ) reaches zero for some value θ
′













− 2kθ1 < 0, for ∆θ = z(e), θ2 > θ.
with max ∂π1(e,θ)
∂θ1







and therefore | θ̃1 − θc1 |< z(e).
Proof of Proposition 5: We first need
Lemma 9 When consumer prices are identical a pure strategy equilibrium cannot exist.
Proof: Given pB1 = p
B
2 , B demand is given by
Di =

1, if θi > θj;
1
2
, if θi = θj; and
0, if θi < θj.






)2 − kθ2i ≥ 0, if θi > θj ≥ θ;
−kθ2i ≤ 0, if θ ≤ θi ≤ θj;
Any profile θ1 = θ2 can never be an equilibrium. Suppose so, then D1 = D2 and platforms
are Bertrand competitors in the A market, realising −kθ2i ≤ 0 each. When −kθ2i < 0, firm
i possesses a unilateral deviation: set θi = θ. When −kθ2i = 0, it also possesses a unilateral
deviation: set θi > θ.
To complete, let pB1 = p
B
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